The current economic environment, characterized by tighter credit conditions and elevated interest rates, has led to a significant increase in corporate debt restructuring proceedings in Brazil and has renewed the debate over the choice between judicial reorganization (recuperação judicial) and out-of-court restructuring (recuperação extrajudicial).
Although both mechanisms are grounded in the principle of preserving viable businesses and overcoming financial distress, as set forth in Article 47 of Law No. 11,101/2005 (the Brazilian Bankruptcy and Restructuring Law – Lei de Recuperação e Falências or “LRF”), their practical effects, degree of judicial intervention and reputational implications differ substantially.
1. Judicial Reorganization: Broad Protection and Intensive Court Supervision
Judicial reorganization remains the principal corporate restructuring tool in Brazil. The mechanism allows for a comprehensive renegotiation of liabilities subject to the proceeding under court supervision and through a collective process involving creditors.
Its principal features include:
- Suspension of enforcement actions through the stay period of 180 days, extendable for an additional 180 days under exceptional circumstances, pursuant to Article 6, §§4 and 5 of the LRF;
- Approval of the restructuring plan by a creditors’ meeting organized by classes of creditors (Articles 35, 41 and 45 of the LRF);
- Availability of the judicial cram down mechanism, allowing confirmation of the plan even without approval by one dissenting creditor class (Article 58, §1 of the LRF);
- Asset protection and the possibility of implementing deep operational restructuring measures, including the sale of isolated productive units (unidades produtivas isoladas – UPIs).
The stay period is the 180-day period following the court’s acceptance of the judicial reorganization filing during which actions and enforcement proceedings against the debtor are suspended. Such period is not automatically extended and may only be renewed for an additional 180 days under exceptional circumstances, upon a reasoned decision by the court.
Following the commencement of judicial reorganization proceedings, the debtor may not dispose of or encumber fixed assets without court authorization, after consultation with the Creditors’ Committee, unless otherwise expressly contemplated in the reorganization plan.
The cram down mechanism replaces the ordinary voting thresholds with a more flexible approval standard, provided that the following requirements are met:
- Favorable vote representing more than half of the total value of claims present at the creditors’ meeting, regardless of class;
- Approval by at least two creditor classes provided for in Article 41 of the LRF (i.e., the majority of classes must approve the plan);
- Approval by more than one-third of the creditors in the dissenting class(es), both in terms of number of creditors and value of claims.
2. Judicial Reorganization: Binding Effect on Dissenting Creditors
A judicial reorganization plan approved in accordance with the LRF is binding upon all creditors whose claims are subject to the proceeding, pursuant to Article 59 of the LRF.
This means that confirmation of the plan results in a statutory novation of all pre-petition claims subject to the proceeding, binding both the debtor and all affected creditors. The original terms of the indebtedness are replaced by the terms set forth in the approved plan for all unsecured and otherwise affected creditors.
Accordingly, even dissenting creditors are required to comply with the plan and may no longer enforce their claims under the original contractual terms.
It is important to note, however, that only claims subject to the judicial reorganization are affected. Tax claims, fiduciary secured claims (alienação fiduciária) and claims legally classified as post-petition or extra-bankruptcy claims (extraconcursais) are generally excluded from the effects of the proceeding. Advance foreign exchange contracts (ACCs) are also expressly excluded from judicial reorganization, while labor claims are subject to a specific payment regime under the LRF.
3. Out-of-Court Restructuring: Greater Flexibility and Limited Court Intervention
Out-of-court restructuring, governed by Articles 161 through 167 of the LRF, is based primarily on a consensual framework.
Under this model, the debtor negotiates directly with specific creditor groups and subsequently seeks court confirmation of the restructuring plan.
The mechanism became significantly more attractive following the amendments introduced by Law No. 14,112/2020, which reduced the approval threshold required for court confirmation from three-fifths (3/5) to more than one-half of the claims within each affected category of creditors (Article 163 of the LRF).
Nevertheless, out-of-court restructuring has important limitations:
- No broad stay period: the filing for court confirmation does not suspend rights, actions or enforcement proceedings brought by creditors that are not subject to the restructuring agreement, as expressly provided in Article 161, §4 of the LRF;
- Reduced coercive effect due to the contractual nature of the mechanism;
- Dependence on qualified creditor support and direct negotiations with participating creditors;
- Restriction of the plan’s effects to the creditors expressly included in and bound by the restructuring plan.
4. Recent Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ) Decisions: Limits of Out-of-Court Restructuring
Recent decisions by the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justiça – STJ) have reinforced important distinctions between judicial reorganization and out-of-court restructuring regimes.
In May 2026, the Third Panel of the STJ, in Special Appeal No. 2.234.939 (Reporting Justice Humberto Martins), reaffirmed that out-of-court restructuring does not suspend enforcement proceedings nor produce novation with respect to creditors that did not adhere to the restructuring plan (Source: STJ).
The decision reinforces the consensual nature of the mechanism and confirms that the effects of court confirmation are limited to participating creditors.
Another noteworthy development is STJ’s consolidation of the requirement that debtors demonstrate tax compliance as a condition for the granting of judicial reorganization, in line with the amendments introduced by Law No. 14,112/2020 (Source: STJ).
5. Strategic Considerations for Companies and Creditors
The choice between judicial reorganization and out-of-court restructuring depends less on the severity of the financial distress and more on the composition of the debtor’s liabilities, the relationship among stakeholders and the short- and long-term objectives of the restructuring process.
| Aspect | Judicial Reorganization | Out-of-Court Restructuring |
| Court intervention | High | Limited |
| Stay period | Broad – Article 6 LRF | Limited – does not affect non-participating creditors (Article 161, §4 LRF) |
| Publicity and reputational exposure | High | Moderate |
| Negotiation flexibility | Lower | Greater |
| Coercive effect on creditors | Strong (cram down – Article 58, §1 LRF) | Dependent on creditor support |
| Approval threshold | Majority by class (Article 45 LRF) | More than half of claims by affected category (Article 163 LRF) |
| Cost and duration | Higher | Lower |
The distinction between judicial reorganization and out-of-court restructuring extends beyond procedural considerations and has become a strategic issue for companies, financial institutions and investors.
Judicial reorganization provides significant coercive power because it binds all creditors whose claims are subject to the proceeding, including dissenting creditors. By contrast, out-of-court restructuring relies much more heavily on negotiations among creditor groups and generally binds only participating creditors.
Accordingly, the choice between judicial reorganization and out-of-court restructuring is not merely procedural. It must be assessed in light of the debtor’s specific circumstances, the composition of its liabilities and security package, and its overall relationship with creditors.
References
- BRAZIL. Law No. 11,101, of February 9, 2005. Regulates judicial reorganization, out-of-court restructuring and bankruptcy proceedings in Brazil. Articles 6, 35, 45, 47, 58 and 161–167. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/lei/l11101.htm. Accessed on: April 16, 2026.
- BRAZIL. Law No. 14,112, of December 24, 2020. Amends Law No. 11,101/2005. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2020/lei/l14112.htm. Accessed on: April 16, 2026.
- BRAZILIAN SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (STJ). Third Panel reaffirms that out-of-court restructuring does not suspend actions brought by creditors outside the agreement. Special Appeal No. 2.234.939. Available at: https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/2026/04052026-Terceira-Turma-reafirma-que-recuperacao-extrajudicial-nao-suspende-acoes-de-credores-fora-do-acordo.aspx. Accessed on: April 16, 2026.
BRAZILIAN SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (STJ). Judicial reorganization proceedings may be suspended if the debtor fails to demonstrate tax compliance. Brasília, February 26, 2024. Available at: https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/2024/26022024-Processo-de-recuperacao-judicial-pode-ser-suspenso-se-empresa-nao-comprovar-regularidade-fiscal.aspx. Accessed on: April 16, 2026.


